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SUBSIDIARITY AND THE PUBLIC–
PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION
RENÉ URUEÑA*
I
INTRODUCTION
Investment treaty arbitration is a form of international dispute settlement. It
allows foreign investors to bring claims against sovereign states that host their
investment on the basis of an alleged breach of those sovereign states’
commitments regarding foreign investment in their territory. If the state has
promised, for example, to extend fair and equitable treatment to the investor,
and the state does not keep this commitment, the foreign investor has standing
to bring a claim against the state before an arbitration tribunal and seek
financial reparation for damages.
Host states often comply with (or breach) their international obligations
toward foreign investors through local decisions and regulations. For instance,
states expropriate a foreign investment through local decisions. Therefore, in
deciding investment disputes, arbitrators often have to scrutinize the behavior
of host states and pass judgment on their local decision-making process.
Investment arbitration involves two levels of decisionmaking: (1) an
international level, where international investment arbitrators assess the
behavior of sovereign states on the basis of international law; and (2) a local
level, where sovereign states adopt decisions regarding foreign investors, which
1
can in turn be assessed by the international investment tribunals.
Because of its two-level architecture, investment arbitration requires some
kind of organizing principle for allocating authority along its vertical axis; that
is, it demands a criterion for choosing whether certain issues should be decided
at the national or international level. The principle of subsidiarity is one such
criterion. As put forward in the introduction to this issue, the principle of
subsidiarity requires decisionmaking to occur at lower levels, unless good
2
reasons exist to shift it upward. Certain international legal regimes, such as the
Inter-American regime of human rights or the law of the European Union
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(EU), expressly provide for subsidiarity as an overarching organizing principle
of the interaction between the domestic and international levels. Investment
arbitration, in contrast, includes subsidiarity in a much less straightforward
fashion. The international investment regime (the law that creates the rights
and duties of foreign investors and gives jurisdiction to courts and investment
tribunals to enforce them) contains no express reference to subsidiarity, or any
other such principle, as an organizing tool for the interaction between the
3
international and domestic levels. As a result, the question of subsidiarity
emerges in investment arbitration in a much less stark fashion than occurs in
human rights or EU law, for example. Thus, subsidiarity is seldom a formal
4
obstacle for the exercise of jurisdiction by investment tribunals. Instead, it
emerges as a question of deference. Though the investment regime gives
arbitration tribunals the jurisdiction to assess local decisions that affect foreign
investments, the degree of deference (if any) that such tribunals should give to
local decisionmakers remains an open question.
Against this backdrop, this article argues that the vertical allocation of
authority has become a space where contrasting views of investment arbitration
as a whole are projected. Subsidiarity in investment arbitration reflects the
public–private distinction that permeates most contemporary readings of
investment arbitration. Specifically, demand for subsidiarity is a function of the
public–private distinction: a private reading of investment arbitration entails a
lower demand for subsidiarity (that is, it demands with less intensity that
decisionmaking occurs at a lower level), whereas a public reading of investment
arbitration entails a higher demand for subsidiarity (requiring with more
intensity that decisionmaking occurs a lower level).
Each mindset justifies its choice between levels of authority in terms of its
own representation of the external pressures faced by the investment regime.
For the public mindset, a central challenge to the investment regime is its lack
of democratic legitimacy as an exercise of public power. Faced with this
pressure, the public mindset features subsidiarity as an answer because scaling
down the level of authority might bridge the investment regime’s legitimacy gap
by reconstituting the democratic credentials of the decisionmaker. In contrast,
for the private mindset, the regime’s challenges emerge from its failure to fulfill
its function of creating legal certainty for investment; thus, scaling up
decisionmaking could enhance the possibilities of a predictable, nonpolitical
regulatory environment. In this context, the vertical allocation of authority,
derived as it is from the public–private divide, works in investment arbitration
as a pressure-relief valve. The valve allows the investment regime to react to the
3. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere:
The Standard of Review in Investor–State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 297 (2010) (explaining
that, regarding domestic regulations, “ICSID tribunals have, as yet, failed to develop a coherent
jurisprudential approach or consistent standard of review”).
4. The exhaustion of local remedies is not required in contemporary investment arbitration. See
Christoph Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration, 4
LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 1 (2005).
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external criticism by shifting authority down to the local level or by scaling it up
to the international level, thus accounting for deep change while remaining
overall stable.
This shifting vertical allocation of authority in investment arbitration can be
mapped onto Jachtenfuchs and Krisch’s conjectures regarding the demand and
supply for subsidiarity in global governance. Their introductory article posits
that demand for subsidiarity might be higher when acts of global governance
5
institutions “are highly intrusive and concern specific cases.” As this article
explains, this intuition proves to be right in the case of investment arbitration,
but it has been permeated by wider debates of global governance, particularly
the public–private divide in governance. Investment arbitration provides a rich
illustration of the pathways through which demand for subsidiarity is
implemented and the shifting ways a wider understanding of governance affects
the demand for subsidiarity in a particular context. Ultimately, the investment
arbitration case underscores the importance of the public–private distinction for
the overall discussion of subsidiarity in global governance.
Moreover, on the supply side of the equation, Jachtenfuchs and Krisch
suggest that subsidiarity will be more present in regimes that deal with issues
without international repercussions and less so in institutions regulating actual
6
or potential negative externalities. This suggestion is partially confirmed by the
investment regime: subsidiarity is likely to appear in the private mindset of
arbitration, which conceives of investment protection as a transnational
concern. The article’s conjecture, though, is not confirmed by the public
mindset of arbitration, which also considers investment protection as a
transnational issue, affecting global public goods and yet calling for subsidiarity
on precisely such grounds.
This article focuses on cases emerging from the Argentinean crisis in 2001
and proceeds in the following way: Part II introduces the vertical allocation of
authority (that is, scaling authority up or down) in international investment
arbitration and traces the role of subsidiarity therein. Part III explores the
public–private division in investment arbitration. Then, part IV, which is the
core of the contribution, explains how the subsidiarity and the vertical
allocation of authority in investment treaty arbitration are a function of the
public–private distinction. Part V concludes by suggesting that the choice of
allocating authority at a specific level is not the result of the inherent
characteristics of the investment regime, but is rather a device to maintain the
stability of the system. The shifting of authority works as a pressure-relief valve,
through which the regime is able to react to discontent. When the legitimacy of
the investment system is questioned, the vertical allocation of authority
operates as a mechanism of marginal adjustment, shifting authority from one
level of governance to the other in order to enhance the system’s legitimacy.

5. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 15.
6. Id. at 16.
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II
SUBSIDIARITY AND THE VERTICAL ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
An international investment agreement (IIA) is a treaty between two or
more states establishing rules that govern investments by their respective
nationals in the other’s territory. These rules are enforced through exceptional
mechanisms of adjudication. Investment agreements usually grant jurisdiction
to arbitration tribunals over disputes between private investors and the host
state, giving investors standing before such international tribunals.
As a form of dispute settlement, investment arbitration is not much different
from other forms of adjudication, with the important exception that a private
party, the investor, is given standing to initiate proceedings against a sovereign
state that would otherwise be immune in the local courts of most foreign states.
Investment arbitration, however, is much more than just a dispute-settlement
mechanism. It is a technology of global governance, in which an international
institution exercises power with a direct impact on individuals beyond the
parties to the investment dispute. As suggested in the introduction to this issue,
7
such intense impact on local politics triggers a high demand for subsidiarity.
Investment arbitration operates as a form of global governance, affecting
local decisionmaking, in at least three ways.
First, investment arbitration often reviews domestic regulation for possible
violations of standards contained in the treaty. For example, a local regulation
may be tantamount to expropriation of a foreign investment, and the
investment tribunal may order compensation to the investor. Thus, even if the
arbitral tribunal has no formal power to strike down local regulations, in effect
the tribunal engages in review of the regulations (including domestic judicial
decisions), assessing them against the standards mandated by the treaty. As a
consequence of such review, host states may decide to strike down their own
regulations or may be deterred from adopting a certain line of regulations—a
phenomenon that has been referred to as a “chilling effect” of investment
arbitration.
Second, investment arbitration tribunals contribute to the definition of
appropriate standards of domestic governance, particularly in their influence on
domestic administrative laws and procedures. Especially through the fair and
equitable treatment standards (though not restricted to them), investment
tribunals review domestic administrative processes and may have an influence
on the framing and application of such local procedures. To assess awards,
arbitration tribunals have established standards applicable to stability,
predictability, and consistency of the legal framework; the protection of
legitimate expectations; procedural and administrative due process; and the

7. See id. at 15.
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requirement of reasonableness and proportionality in domestic administrative
8
proceedings, all of which have an impact in structures of domestic governance.
Finally, international investment arbitration may be subject to domestic
legal review. Up to now, this article has explained that investment arbitration
involves tribunals deciding whether a host state has violated the standards of an
IIA. This is typically a “top-down” process in which the international authority
exercises jurisdiction over the local level of decisionmaking. However,
investment arbitration also involves a “bottom-up” exercise of authority that is
correspondingly read through the public–private lenses. Domestic courts may
also be given jurisdiction to decide whether investment arbitration awards (that
is, the decisions adopted by international investment tribunals) should be
subject to domestic judicial review. In this dimension, it is a matter of the
domestic arbitral law of the site of the arbitration to establish the possibility of
9
judicial review and its characteristics and of the procedural rules of the
arbitration. Thus, crucial considerations are whether a domestic court will have
the jurisdiction to review such awards, and how strict its analysis will be.
Given these characteristics, investment arbitration is not only a disputesettlement mechanism but also a veritable exercise of global governance, which
10
can be compared with other global regulatory regimes. Investment arbitration
involves at least two levels of decisionmaking in which an international
institution (an investment arbitration tribunal) is empowered to adopt decisions
that affect the national or subnational level of governance. Investment
arbitration is an area of governance where the demand for and supply of
subsidiarity, as put forward in this issue’s introduction, can be fruitfully
discussed. States that shape the regime, in close conversation with private
interests potentially benefited by such a move, agree to scale up the authority to
adopt decisions related to foreign investment protection (in particular,
adjudication of investment claims), thus effectively creating a multilevel
structure of governance.
But investment arbitration is not governed by an express principle of
interaction between levels of governance. Despite the multilevel structure they
create, IIAs are typically silent with regard to the framing of interaction.
Furthermore, despite the fact that some IIAs include certain rules concerning
11
exhaustion of local remedies, in most cases arbitration tribunals get little
8. See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor–State Arbitration as Governance:
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, (N.Y.
Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 146, 2009), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_
plltwp/146.
9. See, e.g., Veijo Heiskanen, Matthias Scherer & Sam Moss, Domestic Review of Investment
Treaty Arbitrations: The Swiss Experience, 27 ASA BULL. 256, 256–79 (2009).
10. See, e.g., Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 148–50 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, The Global
Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 701 (2005);
Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 8, at 41.
11. See generally Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella
Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 231–56 (2004) (explaining that the tribunals
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guidance from investment protection treaties as to the relative importance of
domestic decisions in the international tribunal’s decisionmaking. As a result,
given the formal absence of a principle of subsidiarity, this pondering of the
relative authority of domestic decisions is framed as a problem of deference.
Thus, investment tribunals might decide to be deferential to domestic
decisionmakers, thus applying in practice the principle of subsidiarity (in which
power is pushed to the lower level of decisionmaking), or they may decide not
to be deferential at all, thus maintaining the decision-making power at the
international level.
In the absence of an overarching principle of subsidiarity, the international
investment regime implies a double process of vertical allocation authority.
First, the legal framework of the IIA scales up decision-making authority to the
investment tribunal, granting the power to an international authority to
essentially review domestic decisions on the basis of the criteria set forth in the
treaty. And, once exercising its jurisdiction, the investment tribunal assesses the
relative persuasiveness of a domestic decision, deciding whether the decisionmaking power should remain at the international level—if it finds that the
domestic decision is not persuasive—or whether authority can be scaled down
to the national level—if it finds that the domestic decision is persuasive.
Investment arbitration is, in this sense, a regime of governance with a vertical
allocation of authority that is simultaneously stable and in constant flux.
Although a formal allocation of authority gives the investment tribunal
jurisdiction over a domestic decision, the same formal allocation of power
allows for shifting authority along the vertical scale.
When do investment tribunals decide to be more deferential, thus applying
in practice a stronger principle of subsidiarity? For Jachtenfuchs and Krisch’s
conjecture regarding the demand for subsidiarity in global governance,
investment arbitration should be a case where the demand for subsidiarity is
12
high, because it is a form of authority that directly impacts local governance.
The investment case, however, is a much more dynamic process of vertical
allocation of authority. Authority is sometimes pushed downward to the
national sphere, but it also sometimes remains at the international level. This
process can be better understood in reference to the public–private divide that
characterizes the contemporary understanding of investment arbitration, as is
explored in the following two parts.
III
THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVISION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Investment arbitration tribunals embody a form of hybrid dispute
settlement with important implications in terms of global governance. This
hybrid characteristic has created debate among investment law scholars,

are guided by certain parameters defined by BITs).
12. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 15.
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concerning the “private” or “public” nature of the investment regime. Such
characterization will have, in turn, an impact on the overarching vertical
allocation of authority, particularly the demand for a principle of subsidiarity.
This part introduces the public–private divide in investment arbitration, while
the next connects the divide with subsidiarity.
The public–private division in investment arbitration can be defined in
reference to four variables: (1) the legal regime applicable in investment
arbitration; (2) the actors involved in the dispute; (3) the function that
investment arbitration fulfills; and, finally, (4) the issues dealt with by the
decision of the investment award and their overall impact.
Legal Regime. Investment arbitration is established on the basis of a publiclaw instrument (a treaty) concluded between sovereign states. Its basic legal
architecture is that states limit their sovereignty and instead accept the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to adjudicate possible violations of such
13
limits. The arbitral tribunal’s sources are mostly public-law sources, not
14
private-law instruments. In its basic legal structure, then, investment
arbitration resembles the international human rights regime. However, the
procedure of investment arbitration has a private origin, which is reflected in
the overall idea that there should be an equivalence of means between the state
and the investor as disputing parties. The rules of arbitration that are followed
were, for the most part, originally designed for resolving disputes between
private parties and are still characterized by the overall need for confidentiality
15
and the role of the disputing parties as “masters of the arbitration.”
Investment arbitration is a procedural regime created with private disputes
in mind that is now used for adjudicating on the basis of public-law instruments.
This dual nature derives from the early origins of the overall investment regime,
in which developing countries in dire need for foreign capital sought to assure
capital exporting countries that their investments would be safe. This assurance
required, on the one hand, a credible legal embodiment that would effectively
bind the capital importing country. This legal obligation could derive only from
public-law obligations adopted by the capital importing state, which would
effectively limit the state’s sovereign power in its treatment of investors present
in its territory. But traditional public international law had no adjudicative
procedure to enforce these kinds of legal obligations when the beneficiaries
were private parties. Thus, the procedures of arbitration between private actors
and their rule of party equality were used as a template for investment
arbitration. As a result, sovereign nations ended up in the position of being

13. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 39–133 (2009).
14. See Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID
Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835–51 (2005).
15. Rolf Trittmann, When Should Arbitrators Issue Interim or Partial Awards and or Procedural
Orders?, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 255, 262 (2003).
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treated as equals to private parties, even when the former adopted decisions for
16
the general interest of their own communities.
Actors. Actors involved in arbitration procedures also play a role in the
construction of the public–private distinction. For analytical purposes, the
disputing parties can be discussed separately from the arbitrators. Investment
arbitration involves a private actor, the investor, and it also involves a sovereign
state, the quintessential public entity. Arbitrators comprise the second group of
actors involved in investment arbitration. In this regard, the distinction of
public–private also emerges. Arbitrators are normally appointed by the
17
disputing parties and emerge from two different “epistemic communities.” On
the one hand, there are international public law scholars and practitioners with
experience in litigating and solving inter-state disputes, and on the other hand,
there are arbitrators who emerge from the community of international
commercial arbitration. These two epistemic communities are likely to clash
because they have different audiences and perspectives of the role of law, the
18
state, and the function of arbitration.
Function. Investment arbitration has an ambivalent function in global
governance. On the one hand, it ostensibly seeks to solve a dispute between a
private party and a host state. In that sense, it is not that different from
international commercial arbitration, with the (possibly marginal) difference of
having as defendant a sovereign state. However, in order to solve such a
dispute, investment tribunals often fulfill a function that comes close to judicial
review. When exercising their jurisdiction and determining possible
responsibility of a host state, investment tribunals regularly assess domestic
regulations against international standards of treatment. This process of review
can be characterized as public in the sense that it implies a review of domestic
regulation that is itself public. Investment arbitration is, therefore, hybrid in its
function: although it is a dispute-settlement mechanism involving a foreign
investor, it also acts as a judicial institution of review of domestic acts.
Issues. Finally, the public–private division of investment arbitration is also
built in reference to the issues that are involved in the arbitration and the
overall impact of the decisions. Investment arbitration is not solely a disputesettlement mechanism; it has wider impacts on the domestic context of the
investment subject to the dispute and on the overall global regulatory
16. On the origins of the investment regimes, see generally KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL
(2013). Miles’s account differs from the one presented here by focusing on the substantive obligations
of the regime (rather than on the specific form of arbitration), and, following Tony Anghie’s work, links
such obligations to the colonial heritage of international law. For an example of Tony Anghie’s work,
see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005).
17. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
18. Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International
Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875, 888 (2011); see also Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms:
Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 54–55 (2013).
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landscape. These wider impacts have been interpreted along a public–private
19
dichotomy. From this perspective, investment arbitration not only acts as a
private dispute resolution mechanism, but it also implies an exercise of public
authority by impacting local governance in at least the three ways referred to
earlier. The issues that are dealt with in investment arbitration also contribute
to its hybrid character. Arbitration is typically triggered by a claim on the basis
of a foreign investment, which defines a private framework for the controversy.
However, investment controversies often involve the exercise of public power
by the host state, which enter into conflict with the solely private nature of the
investment controversy. Moreover, investment arbitration awards can have a
20
wider impact on the protection of public values, such as human rights or the
21
environment : a domestic decision protecting those values could be hindered or
encouraged by signals from investment arbitration tribunals. Despite the
apparently private nature of the dispute, investment arbitration easily shifts
toward the public domain of governance.
The hybrid nature of the investment regime opens the space for two
competing mindsets of investment arbitration: a public mindset, emphasizing
the public aspects of each characterizing trait of investment arbitration, and a
private mindset, emphasizing the private aspects of the system. The contrast
between these views is at the heart of the public–private divide in contemporary
readings of investment arbitration, and their contrasting views, in turn, define
the demand for subsidiarity in this structure of governance.
IV
SUBSIDIARITY AS A FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The public–private divide is an important aspect in defining the demand for
and supply of subsidiarity in investment arbitration. This connection emerges
indirectly because the question of subsidiarity is not expressly present in the
investment regime. However, as discussed above, it does emerge in the form of
deference. Should international investment tribunals defer to domestic
decisionmakers? Should domestic courts defer to international investment
tribunals? This discussion is framed by specialists in investment arbitration as a
22
problem of the standard of review. This part briefly introduces the concept of
standard of review, and then shows how its use in investment arbitration closely
mirrors the public–private divide explored earlier.

19. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 1, at 45–71; Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International
Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law
Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 71–84 (2011).
20. See Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L
COMP. L.Q. 573–96 (2011).
21. See MILES, supra note 16, at 154–209.
22. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 283–345.
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A standard of review refers to the level of scrutiny that an adjudicator
applies when reviewing the decision—for example, an investment arbitration
award—of a lower court or of another institution. The notion comes from
domestic judicial review and is inspired by the appropriate balance of powers
23
between high courts, lower courts, and institutions in other branches of power.
Put simply, a standard of review sets the questions that will be asked of the
primary decision. Thus, in domestic law, standards of review are often pictured
along a continuum, with completely new review of the primary decision on one
24
end and complete deference to that decision on the other. Thus, when
engaging in judicial review, a court has the option of applying a very strict level
of scrutiny, considering and deciding the legal question anew—in effect
substituting the primary decisionmaker via judicial review. Alternatively, in the
other extreme, the reviewing court has the option of adopting a highly
deferential standard, under which it will give more weight to the primary
decisionmaker.
In domestic systems, deciding the applicable standard of review gravitates
around the specific reason for the review. A certain argument against the
primary decision will entail a particular standard of review. For example, a legal
decision of the primary decisionmaker will most likely be reviewed de novo;
that is, the reviewing court will decide the legal issue without affording the
25
lower court deference. In contrast, other arguments against the primary
decision will warrant a more deferential standard of review. For example,
challenges on the basis of factual errors will most likely trigger a standard of
review in which the presiding court will only look for ostensibly erroneous
26
interpretation of fact by the primary decisionmaker. Short of that, the court
will show deference to the primary decisionmaker.
In international law, the question of standards of review has taken on
specific characteristics of its own. International courts are often reviewing not a
decision by a lower court, but rather the decision of one of the parties to the
litigation—often, a state. Consequently, the issue of standard of review involves
pondering the legitimate policy space of states, which risks being unduly
restricted. Should international courts be deferential to the decisions of
domestic institutions or, on the contrary, should they engage in de novo review
of primary decisions? Exceptionally, in certain specialized regimes, the
language contained in the relevant treaty answers this question. Such is the case
of dumping litigation at the World Trade Organization (WTO), for which the
Article 17.6 Anti-Dumping Agreement provides a specific standard of review in
27
anti-dumping proceedings. That is, however, the exception. In most
23. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 233, 236–41 (2009).
24. For a discussion of the standard of review in U.S. law, see generally Ronald R. Hofer,
Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231–51 (1991).
25. Peters, supra note 23, at 246.
26. Id. at 245.
27. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
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international legal regimes, the question of standard of review is left open for
the relevant court to decide.
Two sources of analytical tools have been developed in international law to
that effect. First, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article XX
permits certain exceptional trade-restrictive measures to be adopted in order to
28
protect public goals such as morality, security, or the environment. Such
exceptional measures must be necessary to achieve the stated goal. Thus, when
deciding whether the measure is truly necessary, the WTO panel and Appellate
Body have developed a consistent body of case law that assesses whether the
state has taken the least restrictive measure reasonably available that meets its
permissible objective under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article
XX. To meet this standard, the defendant state must make a prima facie
argument that the exceptional measure was necessary in its context. In that
case, the panel or Appellate Body will have a deferential attitude toward the
primary decisionmaker. Then the burden of proof shifts to the complainant,
who must prove that the measure is unnecessary (mainly by proving the
29
reasonable availability of a less trade-restrictive alternative measure).
The European Court of Human Rights, in turn, has developed the second
important analytical tool in defining the level of scrutiny to be applied when
30
assessing reviewing domestic measures: the “margin of appreciation” doctrine.
The doctrine refers to the “‘breadth of deference’ that the Court is willing to
grant to the decisions of national legislative, executive, and judicial
31
decisionmakers.” The margin of appreciation is a form of standard of review
under which an international court gives weight to the reasoning of the primary
decisionmaker for reasons of democratic legitimacy, common practice of the
32
states, or expertise.
Investment law has not adopted a specific standard of review. A mix of
33
different standards applies in an uneven fashion. These variable standards of
review can be read as a function of the public–private division of investment
arbitration. As was discussed above, international investment arbitration can be
classified as public or private because its actors, legal structure, and other
dimensions feature characteristics of both. How the arbitration is classified
1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-20, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
29. On the standard of review in the WTO, see generally Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in
WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635–59 (2003).
30. For an introduction to the doctrine, see ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 38–66 (Vaughan Lowe
ed., 1st ed. 2012).
31. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 305.
32. LEGG, supra note 30, at 17.
33. See generally Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The
Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor–State Arbitration, 4 J. INT’L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 197–215 (2013); Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to
Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor–State Arbitration,
15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 223–55 (2012).

5-URUENA INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

110

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

5/22/2016 1:26 PM

[Vol. 79:99

affects the way the standard of review is exercised and, therefore, the demand
for subsidiarity in investment arbitration.
In general terms, a public-law mindset favors allocating authority at the
domestic level. Those with this mindset prefer a deferential standard when
investment tribunals review domestic decisions but favor a nondeferential
standard when domestic courts review investment awards. In contrast, tribunals
and scholars with a private-law mindset favors allocating authority at the
international level. They prefer a nondeferential standard for investment
tribunals and a deferential standard for domestic courts.
On what grounds is the decision to allocate authority at a certain level
adopted? The demand for subsidiarity as a function of the public–private
divide creates a mechanism to maintain the stability of the system by allowing
authority to be scaled up and down. Each mindset (public or private) justifies its
choice between levels of authority in terms of its own representation of the
external pressures faced by the investment regime. The shifting standard of
review (and the implicit shifting demand for subsidiarity) works as a pressurerelief valve through which the regime can react to criticism or discontent. For
the public mindset, a central challenge to the investment regime is its lack of
legitimacy as an exercise of public power. Thus, the vertical allocation of
authority creates a mechanism of marginal adjustment, shifting authority from
one level of governance to the other, which could enhance the system’s
legitimacy—in this case, by moving authority to the domestic level. In contrast,
for the private mindset, the regime’s challenges emerge from its failure to fulfill
its function of creating legal certainty for investment. In that case, the solution
would be to move authority up the scale of governance by creating a centralized
investment court or an appellate facility. Moving authority up and down
permits this kind of adaptation without having to transform the deep structure
of the system. The public–private distinction provides the appropriate rationale
for shifting authority. Through that mechanism, the investment regime is able to
maintain its stability while at the same time adapting to external environmental
pressures.
A. Standards of Review in a Private Mindset of Investment Arbitration
Reading investment arbitration as a private issue reinforces the allocation of
authority at the international level. This allocation may occur in two ways. First,
the relevance of the standard of review can be denied as a whole. Although
investment awards do not make this argument openly, the idea of judicial
review (and, hence, of a standard of review) is completely foreign to
34
international commercial arbitration. Adopting an extreme reading of
investment arbitration as nothing different than international commercial
arbitration would lead to denial of the relevance of standard of review in
investment arbitration. As a result, under certain circumstances, the very
34. Anthea Roberts, The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
16 INT’L COUNCIL COM. ARB. CONGRESS SERIES 170, 173 (2011).
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possibility of giving weight to the reasoning of a domestic decisionmaker, and
scaling down authority, is completely foreign. Under a purely commercial
arbitration mindset, the standard-of-review question does not emerge. And the
authority to decide remains at the international level, not because it is more
appropriate in terms of review, but because the arbitral tribunal understands
itself as a mere mechanism of dispute settlement.
In practice, though, investment tribunals must often ponder domestic
decisions and are thus presented with the need for a standard of review. In that
case, the private mindset of investment arbitration entails giving very little
deference to domestic decisionmakers. Although a standard of review is indeed
applied, it is quite demanding, with little deference given to the principal
decisionmaker. Contrary to what is predicted by the introduction to this issue,
for a private mindset of investment arbitration the demand for subsidiarity will
be low, even if the exercise of authority directly affects important concerns in
local governance. This allocation of political power on a vertical axis is often
explained as a function of political risk on the basis of the obsolescing bargain
35
model (OBM). According to this model, foreign investors face an increased
political risk when the investment is performed. As the cost of withdrawing the
investment becomes higher (for example, as sunk costs increase), the risk of the
original bargain becoming obsolete for the host state increases as well. The
investor is therefore required to hedge such political risk.
Political risk can be hedged through independent adjudication of claims
against the host state. Local courts, however, may be perceived as unreliable for
adjudicating these claims because they may lack independence from the
authorities of the host state involved in the dispute. From the OBM perspective,
it becomes necessary to scale up decisionmaking and empower an international
institution (an international arbitration tribunal, for example) to adjudicate
such claims.
By scaling up, this model suggests, investment disputes become
depoliticized. Local decisionmaking on contentions involving a host state and
important investments is bound to be subject to political pressures. In contrast,
in the early years of the bilateral investment treaty boom, the goal of bilateral
investment treaties was to “insulate private investment from politically driven
foreign or domestic public policy—in effect, to depoliticize investment matters
35. See generally RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD
OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971). For its role as the underlying rationale for the investment regime, see
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT 277 (2011). The OBM has since been questioned on a couple of fronts: (a) multinational
corporations often do not negotiate entry conditions with the host state, but rather engage in a
permanent process of updating investment environment, and (b) certain bargains fail to become
obsolete because the threat of withdrawing the investment remains credible. See Lorraine Eden,
Stefanie Lenway & Douglas A. Schuler, From the Obsolescing Bargain to the Political Bargaining
Model, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 251–72
(Robert Grosse ed.). This critique, though, has not proved influential in foreign investment law. I thank
Nicolás Perrone, whose PhD thesis explores the relevance of the OBM in foreign investment law, for
pointing this literature out to me.
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by placing the protection of private investment under an apolitical legal
36
regime.”
The OBM model is a fundamentally private mindset. It provides a rationale
for allocating authority focused on private concerns: moving the decisionmaking power to the international level is a way of solving the private political
risk of private investors. Host states may decide to accept this bargain for
37
38
multiple reasons (attracting foreign investment, reducing the cost of capital,
or, in the case of least developed countries, securing a competitive advantage
39
over other similarly situated countries). Regardless of the reason for accepting,
when the private interest of the investor is understood to be the dominant
concern in a bilateral investment treaty, the idea of scaling up authority
becomes a necessary part of the overall package. There is, in this sense, a
connection between the private nature of the interests that are being protected
and the low demand for subsidiarity in investment arbitration.
40
41
42
The awards in the Argentinean gas cases (CMS, Enron, and Sempra )
provide a good example of the connection between a private rationale of
investment arbitration, a demanding standard of review, and the low demand
for subsidiarity—evidencing an extremely nondeferential approach to reviewing
43
domestic decisions. The origin of these cases was the Argentinean economic
emergency in 2001, when the Argentinean peso, unpegged from the U.S. dollar,
was devaluated. Moreover, utilities tariffs were frozen, and several restrictions
on capital were imposed (including limits to bank withdrawals and to the
transfer of funds abroad). Several foreign investors had planned their revenue
on the basis of a pegged currency, particularly in the public-utilities sector.
Investors in the gas sector were particularly affected by the crisis. CMS, Enron,
and Sempra were all American corporations invested in this sector: CMS had
bought an important part of TGN, a gas transportation company that operated
under a license that provided for a system of calculating tariffs in dollars (not
pesos), while Enron had invested in government-issued licenses to transport
natural gas and Sempra in licenses to distribute it, all with a similar financial
36. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L
TAX & BUS. L. 159, 160 (1993).
37. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 822–23 (2006).
38. Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing
and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 632 (2005).
39. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 670 (1997). For a discussion opposing this view, see
ALVAREZ, supra note 35, at 181–295.
40. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May
12, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf.
41. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award (May 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf.
42. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28,
2007), http://www.italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf.
43. See generally Henckels, supra note 33, at 203 (arguing that the CMS, Enron, and Sempra
decisions are “well known for their stringent scrutiny of Argentina’s emergency measures”).
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structure. When the Argentinean government decided to eliminate the peso–
dollar parity, all debts denominated in dollars were converted on a 1:1 ratio to
pesos. The peso devaluated, however, bringing significant losses to CMS,
Enron, and Sempra. In response, each corporation filed against Argentina,
claiming, among other things, expropriation and violation of the fair-andequitable-treatment standard.
One of the crucial issues in the dispute was Argentina’s defense of necessity.
The investment treaty between Argentina and the United States provided for a
nonprecluded measures (NPM) clause, which stated that “it shall not preclude
the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of
public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own
44
essential security interests.” Argentina argued that its economic measures
were necessary to maintain its national interests. Among several arguments,
Argentina argued that the necessity clause was self-judging; that the clause fell
upon Argentina to decide whether the measures could be undertaken under
that clause. The tribunal rejected the argument, finding that the necessity
clauses were not self-judging and, rather, that it had jurisdiction to decide
45
whether the clauses could be invoked. From this perspective, decision-making
authority under the clause should remain at the international level. The
tribunal, therefore, engaged in a substantive review of the measures, discussing
in detail whether the financial situation in Argentina actually risked “total
46
economic collapse” or threatened the “very existence of the state and its
47
independence.” Moreover, the tribunal discussed whether the measure was
really necessary, or whether Argentina had a different alternative to deal with
its massive crisis. Here again, the tribunal adopted a nondeferential standard,
and without specifying the actual alternatives available to Argentina, the
arbitrators decided that the measures were not the only means available to react
48
to the crisis.
This line of argument is intimately linked with the OBM rationale for
investment arbitration. José Alvarez was an expert witness for the claimants in
the Argentinean cases, and he defended the non-self-judging character of the
49
NPM clause. For Alvarez, there was no treaty-based argument to justify the
self-judging nature of the clause, nor should there be. According to Alvarez, the
treaty itself did not justify the claim for deference to the domestic

44. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.–U.S.,
art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-2 (1993).
45. Sempra, ¶ 385, 391; Enron, ¶ 332; CMS, ¶ 373.
46. CMS, ¶ 322.
47. Sempra, ¶ 348; Enron, ¶ 306.
48. Sempra, ¶ 350; Enron, ¶ 308; CMS, ¶¶ 323–324. Argentina requested that the tribunals
indicate what alternative measures were available, but the Enron and Sempra tribunals stated such line
of inquiry would be outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Sempra, ¶ 351; Enron, ¶ 309.
49. Sempra, Opinion of José Alvarez, ¶ 11 (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/ita0994.pdf.
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50

decisionmaker, and it should not have recognized such a defense. For him,
there was no normative reason for defending a deferential standard of review
because the system established by the treaty was explicitly designed for allowing
51
investors to forego national courts. In order to preserve the stability of the
investment bargain and a credible investment environment, an investment
arbitrator should (and indeed must) second-guess the motivations of domestic
52
courts.
B. Bottom Up: Domestic Judicial Review of Investment Awards
The private mindset is also reflected in the allocation of authority by
domestic courts when reviewing investment tribunals. When a domestic court
sees an investment dispute as a primarily private controversy with a party that
happens to be a state, that domestic court will be more deferential to the
primary decisionmaker—in this case, the arbitration tribunal. Such was the case
53
in BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina. BG, a British investment
company, had entered the gas sector in Argentina and was affected by the
financial crisis and the Argentinean government’s emergency measures.
BG filed a claim against Argentina under the Argentina–U.K. bilateral
investment treaty. The treaty required the investor to first bring the complaint
before a tribunal in Argentina for at least eighteen months. BG bypassed the
Argentinian courts, however, and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral
investment tribunal. BG did so because Argentina had issued a decree staying
the execution of its courts’ final judgments in suits resulting from the new
economic measures. Moreover, Argentina had undertaken to renegotiate
certain service contracts (such as gas), but it had barred firms that were
litigating against Argentina from that renegotiation. The arbitral investment
tribunal, based in Washington, D.C., decided that Argentina’s changes to its
judiciary excused the investor from exhausting the precondition to arbitration
54
and awarded BG over $185 million in damages.
Both sides filed petitions for review in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia: BG Group demanded recognition and enforcement of the
award (it was adopted under rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law), and Argentina sought to vacate the award.
Argentina’s argument was that the eighteen-months requirement was a
condition for its consent to arbitration. Because BG had not complied with the
requirement, there was no consent for arbitration, the arbitral tribunal lacked
jurisdiction, and the awards had to be vacated. The District Court denied

50. Kathryn Khamsi & Jose Alvarez, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into
the Heart of the Investment Regime, Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008/2009 379, 440 (2009).
51. Id. at 426.
52. Id.
53. BG Grp. PLC. v. Republic of Arg., UNCITRAL, Final Award (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www.ita
law.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf.
54. Id. ¶ 444.
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Argentina’s claims and confirmed the award, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed that ruling. The question before the U.S.
Supreme Court was, then, whether a U.S. court should review the arbitrators’
interpretation de novo or with the deference that courts ordinarily grant to
arbitral decisions.
The Supreme Court framed the issue as a standard commercial arbitration
issue. For the Court, “as a general matter, a treaty is a contract, though between
55
nations,” and, building from that mindset, it deferred to the international
tribunal’s decision. In this contractual approach, the eighteen-months
requirement could not be read as a condition for Argentina’s consent, but
rather as a mere procedural requirement. As a result, the tribunal did have
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court adopted a deferential standard toward its
decision, overturning the Court of Appeals decision to let the investment award
stand. In this case, the private framing of the issue led to the allocation of
authority at the international level.
C. Standards of Review in a Public Mindset of Investment Arbitration
Those who consider investment arbitration an issue of public governance
have questioned Alvarez’s interpretation. The public-law mindset of investment
arbitration emerged as a reaction to the impacts that such exercise of authority
was having in local politics and global governance, which remained unchecked.
The public-law mindset accordingly sought to inject public-law values into
investment arbitration. Some scholars considered investment arbitration a form
of global governance that should be subject to global administrative law
56
principles, such as transparency, participation, and the duty to give reasons,
57
while others saw the need to develop a global constitutionalist framework. Still
others saw in investment arbitration the materials to distill, in an exercise of
comparative law, common public-law principles, which would form the common
58
core of investment protection. All these approaches share the view that
investment arbitration was not a mere dispute-settlement mechanism, as the
private mindset would have it, but rather an actual exercise of global power that
had to be regulated accordingly.
The public-law mindset was not only a scholarly concern, but it also had
important policy implications (involving, for example, an editorial by The New

55. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014).
56. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 10, at 122; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 8, at 50–53.
57. See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION:
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009) (arguing
that requirements of the fair-and-equitable-treatment standard, such as transparency and impartiality,
may amount to a substantive legal framework to control arbitrariness).
58. STEPHAN SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(2009) (suggesting that common standards of investment protection can be found through a public
comparative public-law exercise, through which basic principles of investment law are distilled and
concretized from a wide variety of arbitral awards and other legal materials).
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59

York Times). The public dimension of investment arbitration was even
60
accepted by arbitrators themselves, most notably regarding the right of civil
society to participate before investment tribunals, which has become available
61
during the last decade.
Adopting a public mindset of investment arbitration has an impact on the
standard of review. The public nature of investment arbitration implies that the
standard of review should be deferential to the domestic decisionmaker, thus
scaling authority down. It is true, though, that the public mindset might
62
accommodate varying degrees of deference toward the local decisionmaker.
However, it does feature a difference of essence, not of degree, with the private
mindset. The public approach understands investment arbitration as an exercise
of public authority. It therefore makes sense that such authority is exercised
locally. This may not always be possible (hence the varying degrees of
deference that can be accommodated in the public mindset), and sometimes
authority needs to be scaled up. Such is the definition of subsidiarity, a
rebuttable presumption for the local, as put forward in this issue’s
63
introduction. However, the normative guideline for the public mindset is that
authority should be exercised as closely as possible to the polity that is being
affected. As a result, national authorities should have the first say on issues that
concern investment arbitration, and only exceptionally should authority be
scaled up. The private mindset, in contrast, features no such normative
guideline.
Paradoxically, then, as was the case in the private mindset, politics is also the
key variable that explains the demand for subsidiarity in the public mindset.
While the demand for subsidiarity in the private mindset was low, because the
goal was to isolate decisionmaking from local politics, in the public mindset the
demand for subsidiarity is high, precisely because the goal is to inject
decisionmaking into the legitimacy of local politics.
Perhaps the clearest contrast can be found in the Argentinean gas cases, in
which William Burke-White and Anne-Marie Slaughter served as expert
witnesses for the defendant, arguing among other points that the NPM clause
was indeed self-judging, and that the investment tribunal should therefore
review domestic decisions under a deferential standard of review, such as good
64
65
faith. That argument was rejected by the investment tribunals in the CMS,

59. See Editorial, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/09/27/opinion/the-secret-trade-courts.html?_r=0.
60. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 49 (Jan. 15 2001), http://www.italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0517_0.pdf.
61. See RENÉ URUEÑA, NO CITIZENS HERE: GLOBAL SUBJECTS AND PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 176–99 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2012).
62. See Roberts, supra note 34, at 175–76.
63. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 6.
64. See Sempra, Opinion of William Burke-White and Anne-Marie Slaughter, (July 19, 2005),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0993.pdf.
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67

Sempra, and Enron cases. One part of the reasoning was accepted, however,
in other awards also related to the Argentinean situation.
68
In LG&E v. Argentina, which features facts virtually identical to CMS, the
tribunal rejected the idea that the NPM clauses were self-judging and engaged
in a substantive review of the necessity of the measure. In contrast with CMS,
69
though, the tribunal found that the measures were necessary. The tribunal
engaged in such a substantive review on the basis that the text of treaty did not
provide for the self-judging character of the clause. LG&E was, however,
slightly more deferential to Argentinean policy choices than the CMS, Sempra,
and Enron cases. Although the tribunal rejected the self-judging argument, it
70
left the door open for a deferential standard of review, specifically good faith.
71
This line of reasoning was further developed in Continental Casualty, yet
another Argentinean case. In the case, the claimant, an American insurer who
owned an important stake in the leading provider in Argentina of workers’
compensation insurance, was also affected by emergency measures. Argentina
argued the necessity defense, also based on an expert testimony by Anne-Marie
Slaughter. In line with CMS, the tribunal found that the NPM was not selfjudging; however, it found that if the treaty had clearly established this
possibility, then authority would have to be scaled downward, in deference to
72
the national institution.
The Continental Casualty award uses the WTO Article XX test of necessity
in order to discuss Argentina’s defense. This standard proves more amenable to
Argentina’s claims. Unlike prior awards, which deemed Argentina’s measures
unnecessary if any alternative measure was available, the standard in
Continental Casualty required that the alternative measure be reasonably
73
available to Argentina in achieving its goals. Under this standard, the tribunal
held that Argentina’s measures were necessary under the treaty. Thus, despite
its rejection of the self-judging argument, by importing the WTO standard,
Continental Casualty adopted a standard of review that was more deferential to
the local policy choices by Argentina and allowed for a comparison among
choices.

65. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May
12, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf .
66. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28,
2007), http://www.italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf.
67. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award (May 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf.
68. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability
(Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf.
69. Id. ¶ 257 .
70. Id. ¶ 214.
71. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, (Sept. 5,
2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.
72. Id. ¶ 182.
73. Id. ¶ 198.
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The public mindset suggests that investment arbitration is not merely a
system of settling private disputes and should accordingly adopt a deferential
standard of review. Such is the first doctrinal expression of subsidiarity in
investment arbitration. An alternative justification for scaling authority down,
which has been suggested by public-minded scholars, but has not been
developed by tribunals, is the margin of appreciation. Some suggest that
importing this doctrine from the European Court of Human Rights would best
suit the peculiar circumstances of investor–state arbitration and the limited
capacities of ad hoc tribunals before the International Centre for the Settlement
74
of Investment Disputes. For them, national authorities are better positioned
than an international arbitral tribunal, both in terms of expertise and domestic
embeddedness, to engage in an explicit balancing between the rights and
75
interests at stake. For this reason, “the margin of appreciation allows a
tribunal to set an appropriate space within which national authorities are able
to take regulatory action without a tribunal second-guessing those decisions or
76
acting in a legislative capacity.”
D. Domestic Judicial Review of Investment Awards
The public mindset can be glimpsed in debate around the BG Group
decision, both in the dissenting vote of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice
Kennedy, and in the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae. In his dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice Roberts rejects the commercial arbitration framework adopted by
the majority and underscores the fact that a treaty is not a contract, but rather,
77
an agreement between two sovereign nations. The dissenting opinion clearly
underscores the public dimension of the dispute. For Chief Justice Roberts, “It
is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation to subject itself to suit by private
parties; we do not presume that any country—including our own—takes that
78
step lightly.”
Chief Justice Roberts is emphatic that his line of reasoning does not derive
solely from the fact that the instrument at hand is a treaty. The bilateral
investment treaty should be read as a standing offer to arbitrate by the host
state. If the investor fulfills the requirements put forward in that offer, then the
arbitration agreement is concluded. For the dissenting opinion, the condition
that BG failed to fulfill was not a mere procedural requirement, but a condition
79
of consent to arbitration. Consequently, whether an investor has complied
with that requirement is a question a domestic court must decide de novo,
74. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 323.
75. Id. at 337.
76. Id. Another alternative, suggested by Stephan Schill, is to adopt a standard of review based on
the notion of separation of powers. From this perspective, the appropriate standard of review can be
distilled from a “comparative public law exercise.” Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 593 (2012).
77. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1215 (2014) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1219.
79. Id. at 1218.
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rather than an issue for the arbitrator to decide subject only to the most
80
deferential judicial review. Moreover, since the requirement was one of local
remedies, the dissenting opinion sees “no reason to think that arbitrators enjoy
81
comparative expertise in construing the local litigation requirement.” As a
result, the dissenting opinion would have remanded the award to the lower
82
court for it to engage in a de novo review of the award. The public framing of
the issue seems to point, though in a less clear fashion than the other examples,
to a less deferential standard of review of the international award and to a
preference for a vertical allocation of authority at the national level.
V
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DISTINCTION AND THE
ROLE OF DEFERENCE IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
This article argues that the demand for subsidiarity is a function of the
public–private divide in investment law. Tribunals and scholars with a publiclaw mindset favor allocating authority at the domestic level. Further, they favor
a deferential standard when investment tribunals review domestic decisions and
a nondeferential standard when domestic courts review investment awards. In
contrast, tribunals and scholars with a private-law mindset favor allocating
authority at the international level. They favor a nondeferential standard for
investment tribunals and deferential standards for domestic courts. Thus the
investment arbitration case underscores the importance of the public–private
distinction for the overall discussion of subsidiarity in global governance. The
relation can be mapped in the following way:

Top-down
investment
tribunals review
domestic
decisions

Bottom-up
domestic courts
review
investment
awards

80. Id. at 1221.
81. Id. at 1223.
82. Id. at 1224.

Public mindset

Private mindset
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Such a sharp division between the public and private nature of investment
arbitration, though, seems untenable. Investment arbitration is fully public—an
aspect of the regime acknowledged by neither the private nor the public
mindsets explored here. The private rights that are recognized by the investor
and the private arbitral procedure are expressions of public power: they are
83
created, defined, guaranteed, enforced, and adjudicated by public power. In
that sense, investment arbitration is not public because it exceptionally involves
public interests such as national security or the environment. It is public
because there are, in fact, no purely private matters involved: all matters,
including the rights of the investor, are expressions of public power. If
understood in this way, purely private commercial arbitration is also public, in
the sense that it is also created by the power of the state. The distinction, in this
sense, is trivial, and it may obscure more than it enlightens. Because the whole
area of purely private arbitration can be understood as public power, the
84
distinction easily collapses.
The fact that the investment regime is fully public implies a general
assessment of its role in the distribution of entitlements. Foreign investment
law, both substantive and procedural, established a set of rules that allows for a
certain form of bargain between the investor and the state. It gives to the
investor certain powers, and to the state other powers, thus defining the frontier
of possibilities of their interaction. In this context, the crucial issue regarding
the demand for subsidiarity in investment arbitration stops being the
appropriate level of deference and becomes how a level of deference constitutes
entitlements in the overarching bargain between investors, states, and civil
society. Who was given a stronger position in the bargain table when the CMS
tribunal decided to apply a nondeferential standard of review? Who would be
given a weaker position at the table through importing the margin-ofappreciation doctrine? Thinking of investment arbitration as fully public, all the
way down, implies that subsidiarity is not only a form of vertically allocating
power between different levels of governance. It is also a form of horizontally
distributing power between different actors engaged in the overall bargain of
foreign investment: states, investors, and civil society.
But, even if the public–private distinction easily collapses, the demand for
subsidiarity is still hinged on its currency. The distribution of entitlements
through public power is not the focus of the public-law mindset of investment
arbitration. On the contrary, this mindset builds on the notion that there are,
indeed, some private interests in investment arbitration (for example, the right
of the investor) that are in principle outside the discussion of public law. Only
when they collide with public values do they become relevant for a public law
83. For a similar argument regarding private property, see generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470–94 (1923).
84. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1349, 1357 (1982).
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analysis. The public-law mindset of investment arbitration reaffirms the public–
private distinction—despite the fact that the whole system is fully public, it still
reinforces the idea that there are private rights that are outside the public
sphere that are in principle autonomous from public interests.
Much scholarly effort is invested in arguing that investment arbitration is a
public system of governance, but this effort builds on the very idea that that
there are, indeed, purely private areas of investment law to begin with. This
premise seems questionable and indeed has been questioned through a
85
longstanding tradition of critique of the public–private distinction. Specifically,
contemporary scholarly interventions that reify the inherent nature of a public
86
or private governance, by speaking of new “hybrid” governance or by trying
87
perpetuate the distinction as a desirable “regulative” idea, must be questioned
because the difference obscures important dynamics of power and, specifically,
hides the important role of public power in supposedly purely private bargains.
Instead, the public–private division and its effects in terms of subsidiarity
should be explored from the perspective of the stability of the overall system.
The vertical allocation of authority, derived as it is from the public–private
divide, works in investment arbitration as a pressure-relief valve; it allows the
investment regime to react to the external criticism by reshifting authority down
to the local level or by scaling it up to the international level, thus allowing for
deep change while remaining overall stable.

85. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423 (1982).
86. See Lorenzo Casini, ‘Down the Rabbit Hole’: The Projection of the Public/Private Distinction
Beyond the State 5 (Jean Monnet Working Paper, Paper No. 8, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349841&download=yes.
87. Matthias Goldmann, A Matter of Perspective: Global Governance and the Distinction between
Public and Private Authority (and Not Law), (Jan. 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2260293.

